A man who more than paid his dues to the old country

Edward Kennedy was one of the few politicians with enough clout to swing Irish-American opinion away from violence

Maurice Hayes

September 01 2009 04:45 AM

SENATOR Edward Kennedy is rightly regarded in the North (and certainly in nationalist circles) as one who from the other side of the Atlantic made a sustained, concerned and ultimately effective contribution to the achievement of peace and to the long and tortuous diplomacy which resulted in the Good Friday Agreement.

Others will write of his towering contribution to American politics over a long and productive senatorial career, his espousal of civil rights issues, his contribution to more compassionate social policies, and his support for the poor, the defenceless and the underprivileged in society.

His interest in Irish affairs, although not central to his domestic political programme, was a significant component of the peace process here. It was not a matter, as unionist detractors often claimed,of playing to the Irish-American gallery for votes. For one thing, as a Kennedy in Boston he did not have to.

For another, his stance against violence and against IRA activity, and his subsequent insistence on total decommissioning, set him at odds from time to time from mainstream Irish-American sentiment, which was knee-jerk anti-British, pro-Irish republican, pro-IRA, for Noraid and the Caucus.

He was one of the few senior American politicians who had the status and the clout to swing Irish-American opinion away from violence, to offer a more sophisticated analysis of the problem, and to assist those, mainly the SDLP, who were offering an alternative agenda to armed struggle.

He was a consistent supporter of the policies of successive Irish governments; he was in a position to influence American government policy at critical junctures, and through them, British policy too.

The key linkage in all this was John Hume, whose role in securing the interest, and the trust of leading American political figures was crucial, as was his close and enduring relationship with Ted Kennedy.

Kennedy first sought out Hume in mid-1973. He would, no doubt have been attracted by Hume's civil rights credentials and his commitment to non-violence.

He would also, through his tragic family history, have been more aware than most Irish-American politicians, of the murderous potential of random political violence and terrorism.

Up to that time, Kennedy's public utterances on the Northern Ireland situation had been typical of the hard-line Irish-American Brits-out approach, which caused him to be characterised in unionist demonology (as indeed was John Hume) as an implacable enemy for long after he had ceased to be anything but a tireless and disinterested worker for an honourable and peaceful settlement which would accommodate all interests.

Subsequent to his encounter with Hume, and developing directly from it, Kennedy adopted a much more nuanced position.

He totally adopted Hume's analysis, which even then seminally included the geometry and many elements of the eventual agreement.

The most significant outcome of the relationship, sustained over decades, was the entree which it gave John Hume, and also, on a parallel track, successive Irish Ambassadors, to the highest levels in the Democratic party, and to a remarkable network of contacts across the broad spectrum of US politics.

The principal manifestation of this was the recruitment by Kennedy of Speaker Tip O'Neill, Governor Carey and Senator Daniel P Moynihan to form with him the fabled Four Horsemen, who were joined in the Reagan years by senior Republicans.

Through Reagan, they forced Margaret Thatcher to soften her conviction that it was a domestic security problem, and to engage with the Irish government in the process that was to lead to the Anglo-Irish Agreement and ultimately to talks with all the political parties (but not yet republicans).

Later Kennedy was to be a major influence in the decision of the Clinton administration, against massive British diplomatic pressure, to grant a visa to Gerry Adams -- which was crucial to securing the support of IRA sponsors and supporters in the US for Sinn Fein's involvement in the process.

After the Good Friday Agreement, the senator was consistent in urging Sinn Fein to become involved in policing and for the IRA to disarm.

At least he had the satisfaction of seeing peace restored in his lifetime, and a power-sharing government installed at Stormont (albeit at the political expense of his mentor John Hume and the SDLP).

As an Irish-American, keenly aware of ancestral ties, he had more than paid his dues to the old country.