Denis O'Brien will be left $1.7bn (€1.6bn) better off if Digicel bondholders accept his proposal to slash what they are owed by his telecoms empire.
While Mr O'Brien will put in $50m to sweeten the deal - half cash and half by way of a Digicel office block he owns in Jamaica - lenders will take a massive hit just to keep the company afloat. Under the deal on the table, some bondholders who accept the offer now would get 49pc of Digicel in three years' time if they have not been repaid the new, lower debt in the meantime.
The 49pc stake is tied to a convertible bond. This means a class of bondholders who'll hold that convertible debt will potentially get almost half of Digicel three years from now, but only if things fall apart again in the meantime to the extent that even the new, lower debts cannot be honoured. As it stands though, Mr O'Brien will put up a relatively small stake to retain ownership of a newly cleaned-up Digicel with debts of about $5.3bn. He currently owns a version of Digicel that has debts of about $7bn.
Bondholders will write off $1.7bn of debt, in exchange for a smaller amount of new bonds with somewhat improved security and higher interest payments. It begs the question of why bondholders would accept it.
In the first case, we do not know that they will. The bondholders have until April 8 and April 14 to respond to aspects of the offer now on the table. Those dates help concentrate minds but are not something the company can really enforce. Bondholders could reject the deal outright or, more likely, will seek changes to the current proposal that are more favourable to themselves.
On the other hand, and what Digicel is betting on, is the following. If bondholders reject the offer outright, and do not agree an alternative, they are ultimately faced with either trying to take over and run it themselves or even the possibility of a collapse of the group under the weight of its debts.
The nature of Digicel means that would be daunting at the best of times. The group operates in 32 different legal jurisdictions spanning the globe just south of the equator, from Haiti to Papua New Guinea.
Those complicated operations prop up an even more complex debt structure where you would have competing levels of bondholders all secured on different assets in a variety of markets.
Unpicking all of that and keeping the wheels spinning at the same time would be hugely challenging. The nature of most bondholders is also a factor. Most institutional lenders are allergic to taking equity in companies.
When they do, they must often carry its value on their books at zero. This is because, in many cases, their mandate from investors is to lend money, not to buy companies. There is a class of investor - so-called vulture funds - with the scale, skill and appetite to swoop into distressed debt situations with a view to taking control.
We saw plenty of that action in the last crash, most notably when Blackstone's Stephen Schwarzman led a massively successful takeover of Eircom that included writing off 40pc of the debt and taking all of its shares through an examinership.
There are only ever a handful of investors globally who will take on that type of venture. An established former telecoms incumbent like Eircom, in a single, highly regulated market like Ireland, with a legal system and culture that was very familiar to US and UK-based investors, is a very different proposition to Digicel.
At the best of times, the complexity and shape of Digicel means that elbowing Mr O'Brien out of the equation would be far more challenging than it was to knock Eircom's Singaporean owners off the field.
Doing it during an unprecedented global economic crisis means that it would be brutally difficult.
So far, there does not appear to be a distressed debt buccaneer involved in the Digicel process, although that could change given the value that now appears to be up for grabs.
The bondholders' decision ultimately boils down to whether they believe they will emerge better off with Mr O'Brien in-situ - even if that means a haircut - than they would without him.