IT WAS the purpose of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) to bring together political opposites in Northern Ireland. Its message was peace and harmony, better understanding and friendship, with all parties working together and committed to democracy. Above all, it was designed to end sectarianism, not just religious sectarianism but the social exclusion of fanaticism and intoleran

IT WAS the purpose of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) to bring together political opposites in Northern Ireland. Its message was peace and harmony, better understanding and friendship, with all parties working together and committed to democracy. Above all, it was designed to end sectarianism, not just religious sectarianism but the social exclusion of fanaticism and intolerance.

One of the prices paid for this was a deliberate and considered denial of old-style democracy, where the majority ruled. This was set aside, or surrendered, in favour of the new alternative, and it was a reasoned decision constructed in good faith, on the basis that, if it worked, it would reconcile the two "sects" in the North.

It has had the opposite effect. The Good Friday Agreement and the so-called "Peace Process" have given strength to the political extremes and demolished the base for the middle-ground parties.

I believe the form of the sectarianism goes beyond the purely religious interpretation of the term. The sects are, broadly speaking, Catholic and Protestant. But in reality they are sectarian in other ways, including loyalty - the "Green" and "Orange" distinctions - which then translate into a theoretical wish to "unite" with either Britain or Ireland.

Most of all, they do not want to unite with each other.

There was always a racial dimension, though not in the ethnic sense. By racial, in the Irish context, is meant, on the one hand being "British" and loving the Crown. This amorphous race cared about the defence of the realm. They had memories of military heroism, standing against oppression, being Saxon and being religiously independent.

The opposite was being "Celtic", republican, Roman Catholic, having a different sense of religious authority and different views on the global loyalty which historically embraced dislike or scorn for the crown, and the "omerta" principle of Catholics living in a Protestant-controlled society for centuries.

Those who believed in the Belfast Agreement believed that the lessening of this set of divisions in Irish society, however long it might take, was a good objective and was being embarked on in a mood of agreement and progress.

How wrong we were. It may be happening at lower political and social. But at the top the opposite is happening. In the past the unionists were guiltier than nationalists in promoting both political and religious sectarianism. They were brutal in their arrogance and short-sighted in their judgment. Or so everyone thought.

This was particularly the case at the time of Sunningdale. Then there was a possible middle ground, where some unionists and some nationalists could accommodate the idea of power sharing. But again, as it had then, it hinged on giving too much or taking too much. Then it was the relatively innocuous idea of a Council of Ireland.

How much this has changed. Today, the most sectarian organisation on the island of Ireland, in terms of fanaticism and intolerance, is Sinn Fein-IRA. And they have gone way beyond "Council of Ireland" thinking. They stand guilty of having wrecked the principles and the practice of the Good Friday Agreement and of having brought to a complete standstill all prospect of further progress towards peace.

They achieved this degree of power because of the collective decision to follow through on a non-democratic inclusion of all parties in the deal. This gave to extremists the prospect of being able to negotiate to extreme positions on issues that were critical and central to life for the majority, including moderate unionists and moderate nationalists.

For example, they forced major concessions on police reform and on the removal of the British military presence. They obtained as well the release of convicted terrorists, and they did this without relinquishing their guns and explosives, without embracing democracy, and therefore without qualifying within the terms of the Good Friday Agreement as it was understood by the majority of people on this island.

The extremes have grown in power and in direct opposition to each other. Neither will give without winning concessions. And the concessions are usually a denial of the position of the other side. The circumstances of the Good Friday Agreement was always much cruder than Sunningdale. After years of violence, the issue was about guns and killing, and bombs in Britain. The needs that provoked this structure blunted the edge of judgment.

It was believed, quite wrongly, that the underlying sectarianism, in what appeared to be a new deal offered by the Good Friday Agreement, was at least likely to diminish, and would, inevitably, bring the communities together. It has done the reverse. It has polarised them.

The sectarianism has become worse. It has intensified in virtually all the dimensions outlined. The politicians in power, notably Blair and Ahern, but also to a lesser extent Clinton, by extra engagement with those making the more extreme demands, encouraged them to reinforce their positions.

In fairness, the unionist side, both under Trimble and Paisley, because they were also committed to exclusive democracy, became less extreme in their demands. They wanted an end to violence and the removal of the paramilitary equipment that could deliver mayhem and chaos. Are society's representatives wrong to demand that?

But because of a largely biased media view of them and the antagonism of both Blair and Ahern, they were successfully painted into a corner and made to take the same degree of blame for an extreme, sectarian position as the republican movement.

Blair and other politicians have become the creatures of this new sectarianism and do not know how to get out of it. Negotiations which were intended to resolve and bring together. They became, instead, a battle-ground for enhanced extremism. Demand and counter-demand were an augmentation of the sectarian divide, quite the opposite of what was intended.

Furthermore, whether written or unwritten, spoken or not, in both parliaments, in London and Dublin, there was an additional pact that favoured the encouragement of sectarianism. This was the quite effective bi-partisanship which denied proper debate.

Collectively, all sides accepted a broad and woolly principle of a peace process which, before their eyes, was hardening the lines of demarcation on sectarian terms.

What was reasoned and constructed in good faith, on the basis that, if it worked it would reconcile the two "sects" in the Northern Ireland and in the South to a very much lesser extent, has turned into a nightmare. And current developments, most notably the McCartney demonstration of several different aspects of this sectarianism at its worst, should have opened our eyes to the mistake we made at the outset.

- Bruce Arnold