Anglo Irish Bank has a lot of dirty little secrets. Let's look in some detail at one of them, a thing called, "subordinate debt". Never heard of it? Well, it's about time you did. You and your kids (and their kids) will be paying for the antics of the banking fat cats long after scheming bastards like Sean FitzPatrick are just a bad memory.

First, a caveat. Economists and academics speak a language all their own. However, we're picking up the tab, so we're entitled to try to figure out what's happening. That means poking through the undergrowth of economic jargon -- in our layperson's ignorance -- trying not to jump to conclusions.

On the morning of Wednesday October 8, "subordinate debt" was mentioned in the Dail. This was just over a week after the Government gave its blanket guarantee to the banks, leaving us exposed to the extent of 440 billion euros, should anything go wrong.

Why, asked Labour leader Eamon Gilmore, was "subordinate debt" included in the bank guarantee?

Subordinate debt is money effectively loaned to the bank by extremely rich people. This is high-risk money, billions of euros. These loans are unlikely to be repaid in the event of a liquidation -- and therefore they attract very high interest rates.

And, just to make things more complicated, there appear to be two kinds of subordinate debt -- the dated kind and the undated kind.

In the Dail on October 8, Eamon Gilmore said that Germany, Denmark and the UK don't provide "a guarantee or cover for dated subordinated debt. Why was this form of debt included in the Irish scheme? Approximately how much of this debt exists?"

Gilmore suggested that in the weeks prior to the Government guarantee, as Anglo floundered, there was frantic trading in subordinate debt, as rich people sought to offload the risk.

Brian Cowen didn't answer the specific questions. He said only that the blanket guarantee to banks was given "on the basis of the advice from those who are competent to so advise the Government".

The Government wallowed in self praise about its blanket guarantee. It refuted suggestions that the banks were under-capitalised.

Meanwhile, what exactly was the score with "subordinate debt"? It seems that "dated subordinate debt" was covered by the blanket guarantee, but "undated subordinate debt", wasn't.

Such niceties were swamped by the Sean FitzPatrick scandal, which erupted on 18 December.

As the conniving little gouger's schemes were revealed, the Government reversed course and moved to recapitalise the banks, setting aside €1.5bn for Anglo.

On December 23, Morgan Kelly, professor of economics at UCD, published a scathing piece in the Irish Times: "the bailout of Anglo Irish follows a compelling political logic. Anglo Irish funds developers, and developers fund Fianna Fail. By any other criterion, a bailout of Anglo Irish is senseless."

The bank should have been allowed to fail.

"Institutions such as AIB and Bank of Ireland fulfil an economically vital role of clearing payments and lending to households and businesses. Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide were purely conduits for property speculation." Professor Kelly concluded: "For all it will achieve, the money might as well be piled up in St Stephen's Green and incinerated."

That evening, Dr Alan Ahearne, of the Department of Economics in NUI Galway, went on RTE's Drivetime, where he questioned why Anglo was being saved. "The market is saying that Anglo Irish Bank is bust, it cannot be resurrected . . . why is the Government insisting on putting more and more money into it?"

Presenter Mary Wilson asked if he could understand why.

If you look at Anglo's accounts, Ahearne said, "there is some stuff there, some subordinated debt, about €2.8bn worth, that's not covered by the guarantee . . . if Anglo Irish is liquidated, then the people who own that €2.8bn will probably get nothing back . . . but if the Government puts the €1.5bn in, and if it puts it in junior to these loans . . . and the statement the other day says that it does rank below that . . . if that's the case, then those people will not lose that €2.8bn because they'll get the €1.5 billion that the Government is pumping in. So, either I'm misreading the statement, there's some problem with the statement -- or, there's something not right about the way this bank is being recapitalised."

That was two days before Christmas, at which point we all overdosed on turkey and forgot about boring bank stuff.

Last week, at UCD, a conference of economists discussed the financial crisis. In a paper prepared for that conference, Dr Patrick Honohan of TCD, former advisor to the World Bank, mentioned subordinate debt. His language was flat and measured.

"Sizable unguaranteed subordinated debt -- amounting to several billion euros -- remains in the balance sheets of the banks. If loan losses are larger than are now being projected by the banks, unguaranteed subordinated debt holders would, under the present financial structure, be exposed to losses; but an injection of capital junior to these liabilities would transfer the burden of those losses to the taxpayer." (Our emphasis.)

Dr Honohan, in what might be termed an understatement, added: "This important point has not received sufficient public attention."

Two days later, the Government announced it wouldn't put €1.5bn into Anglo. It would instead nationalise the bank, at even greater potential cost to the taxpayer.

Why? Because Anglo is the country's "third-biggest bank". Well, it's not.

Yes, in money terms it's huge. But Anglo isn't a high street bank. It's a casino within which rich people -- speculators, developers, builders -- gambled on the property bubble.

Yes, it's huge in money terms, but not because it's embedded in the Irish economy -- only because it borrowed and loaned to reckless extremes, for gambling purposes.

And the alleged "reputational" loss, because of Sean FitzPatrick's activities, is puzzling.

Everyone knew about the behaviour of that avaricious swine since December 18, and have learned little of substance since.

The subordinate debt puzzle is just one of the mysteries surrounding the handling of the Anglo crisis.

What's happening?

Buggered if I know, but it's very, very worrying. Fianna Fail has a history with developers and speculators, which rightly raises suspicions.

However, there may be nothing sinister going on, it might merely be incompetence. Or foolishness.

Transparency is paramount in these matters, and a government should say, "Here's what's happened, here's what we intend doing, and here's why". It should answer every question fully and openly -- "commercial sensitivity" doesn't apply in a lifeboat.

Instead, we've had fumbling, stumbling reversals, with inadequate and sometimes risible explanations. Perhaps there's a reason the Cowen/Gormley regime is unforthcoming.

On Tuesday, the Dail sits to consider these matters. On previous performance, the Government will stonewall, the opposition will bluster.

But this is too important. Already, the country's credit rating has been downgraded, which means it will pay billions more for the loans it needs to stay afloat.

If this goes wrong -- and it's going that way now -- the country will go bankrupt, the State won't be able to borrow or pay dole or pensions or wages for nurses or teachers.

The potential consequences are enormous.

If necessary, on Tuesday the opposition should nail shut the doors of the Dail chamber and refuse to allow Cowen and Lenihan out until clear, precise, credible explanations are given about the subordinate debt matter and the other banking mysteries that threaten us.

This is far more important than protocol, manners or party political advantage.

Never has the Dail had more need of Joe Higgins and Tony Gregory.

- Gene Kerrigan