So, Jean-Pierre, here is how it all went wrong . . .
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You ask whether I can explain why the Irish rejected the Lisbon Treaty so decisively. You say that you do not understand what economic and political arguments can have persuaded them to do so.
The honest answer is that I am not sure that a mere letter can cover all the factors or adequately analyse the situation. However, I believe that you, as a loyal and long-standing friend of Ireland and a committed European, are entitled to a report from the battlefield.
Two major themes, three moods or states of mind and a plethora of deeply felt single issues emerged from the many official and unofficial opinion polls during the past few weeks.
The first theme was that of loss. The Lisbon Reform Treaty was portrayed as depriving Ireland of "her" commissioner in rotation, cutting back the number of "her" members of the European Parliament, curtailing the ability of the Irish Government to legislate for its people or to maintain Irish neutrality.
The idea of a permanent rather than a six-monthly rotating chair was portrayed as the loss of Ireland's opportunity, albeit once in about 14 or 15 years, to chair the Prime Ministerial Council. The size of the 'Yes' vote is an indication that such an interpretation of the attempt to equip the European Union to face the reality of the current geo-political world was not universally accepted. Nevertheless, the theme was strongly played and arguments that, in the interests of the EU as a whole, others were also losing some representation were treated as further reasons for a negative vote, "on behalf of those who do not have a referendum".
You may be surprised to hear that some Irish voters rejected the treaty on behalf of the French and Dutch voters who had rejected what Lisbon was designed to rectify. There were even some young French people outside the General Post Office in Dublin, that icon of Irish republicanism, to support the 'No' side. A member of the UKIP party urged the Irish to vote 'No' because the UK "should have had a referendum."
The second theme was that Ireland should not be bullied by the rest of Europe, particularly by the bigger member states. I am afraid that quotations from France were used effectively in this context by those campaigning for rejection. The comment by your foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, that a 'No' would be bad for the Irish was taken as a warning and a manifestation of a threat. The extension of qualified majority voting was portrayed as having the potential to swamp a small member state. The limitations on its use were mentioned by the 'Yes' campaigners but seem to have got lost in the general clamour. There was little discussion of the increased powers to the European Parliament, or of better and more structured relations with national parliaments or of the citizens' right of petition -- all of which are in the treaty.
Three of what I might call 'states of mind' were pervasive. The first was that the Lisbon Treaty is a very complicated document and is difficult to understand. As you know, Jean-Pierre, I advocated, long ago, that any referendum on a treaty should encapsulate the essence of the treaty and the people should be asked to endorse or reject it. You, however, pointed out that such an approach could give rise to years of challenges through the courts, as each article might be subjected to analysis to determine whether or not it was in accordance with the referendum. You were right, but the result is that any treaty, particularly one that has been negotiated with great difficulty, in this case agreed with Irish help, is inevitably complex.
In fairness, the National Forum on Europe (set up in 2001 after the first rejection of the Nice Treaty) has travelled throughout the country to allow open debate on European questions, including the Lisbon Treaty, while the Commission on the Referendum, established last April, set out the salient points, made the text available on the internet and provided a leaflet with the main arguments for each household.
These efforts were not enough and the legal tone of the referendum, plus the admission in the early days by more than one senior politician that he had not actually read the treaty, were enough to support the "I don't understand it and I won't endorse something I don't understand" stance.
The second 'state of mind' was that there must be a better deal available if Ireland said 'No' to the treaty. The attraction of this approach is that the advocate does not have to say what the better deal is. It is argued simply that the responsibility for securing an improved situation is the responsibility of government. No matter how often the Government and all three political parties supporting the treaty stated that there was "no plan B", the argument persisted. This is partly due to the overhang from the Nice Treaty and the second referenda that were held in Denmark and Ireland in the past, with some alterations to the original treaties. Nice and Lisbon are different treaties and the EU has become bigger and is facing more urgent problems, so I would not be sanguine about a satisfactory solution.
The third 'state of mind' was that the referendum presented an opportunity for certain sectors to bargain domestically -- "Give us 'x' and we will tell our members to support the referendum".
The most blatant example is probably that provided by the Irish Farmers Association.
Having criticised a range of subjects, including the WTO negotiations under Peter Mandelson, the leadership agreed to ask for support for the referendum just before the voting date. Not surprisingly therefore, the majority in most rural areas voted against ratification.
Passionate voices argued the treaty would introduce abortion on demand, increase prostitution, brainwash children at three years of age and destroy "our Christian way of life". Some argued it would be bad for business, others that it was a plot by business and the political establishment to undermine the plain people of Ireland.
What happens next? The 'No' side are ecstatic. The blame game on the 'Yes' side has not yet begun in public. The forthcoming meeting of the European Council will be the first barometer of the European Union mood.
Are you any wiser? As a democrat and businessman you understand the ebb and flow of "the will of the people".
This result could have happened in any member state. It is what happens next that will determine Ireland's fate in Europe and Europe's capacity to equip itself for the future.
Yours, in hope that the rest of Europe can help,
Miriam.
Miriam Hederman is a former Chancellor of the University of Limerick
- Miriam Hederman
