Russia's actions in Crimea will make convincing states to follow Kiev and give up nuclear arms all the harder
Published 22/03/2014 | 02:30
Adolf Hitler's 1938 threats to, and eventual occupation of, Czechoslovakia bore some similarities to what is now happening between Russian president Vladimir Putin and Ukraine.
In 1938, Hitler exaggerated, and stirred up, grievances over language rights in the German-speaking part of Czechoslovakia. He directed the local German-speaking leaders inside Czechoslovakia to ensure that they did not reach any settlement with the Czech government. He used the lack of an internal settlement as a basis for seeking to incorporate these areas, known as the Sudetenland, into Germany, under the pretext of protecting the rights of the German speakers.
Western leaders tried to mediate without success, culminating in the showdown at Munich, where British prime minister Neville Chamberlain abandoned Czechoslovakia in return for a piece of paper signed by Hitler and himself in which both agreed on "the desire of our two peoples never to go to war again."
Eventually, when Hitler broke his word and occupied the whole of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, trust broke down completely.
Hitler tried the same game with Poland in August 1939, possibly thinking he would get away with it again and the British and French would again huff and puff but do nothing. If that was his calculation, he was mistaken.
The crisis over the Sudetenland in 1938 played out more slowly than the one over Crimea. Putin has acted with much greater speed. In the former case, there was even time for a British Commission of Enquiry, the Runciman Commission, to spend a few weeks studying the situation on the ground in the Sudetenland and report back to London.
There is another important difference between the situation of Ukraine and that of Czechoslovakia. France had a Treaty of Mutual (military) Assistance with Czechoslovakia, which had been signed in 1925, guaranteeing Czech borders. Britain had no such treaty but was drawn in because of its strategic commitment to France. That is why the Czechs feel, to this day, a particular grievance about France's lack of action in 1938.
In contrast, Ukraine does not have a military alliance with any western country. It is not a member of NATO, and has no treaty-based military guarantees of its borders.
But, since 1994, Ukraine does have a general guarantee of its borders from Russia, the US and Britain, given in return for giving up its nuclear weapons arsenal. According to this so-called Budapest Memorandum, Russia, the US and the UK confirmed, in recognition of Ukraine becoming a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and in effect abandoning its nuclear arsenal to Russia, that they would: respect Ukrainian independence and sovereignty within its existing borders; refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine; and refrain from using economic pressure on Ukraine in order to influence its politics.
This is hugely important, and creates a major moral obligation because one of the goals of global policy is to get countries with military nuclear capacity to give it up in return for guarantees. If such guarantees can be unilaterally abandoned without consequence, this strategy for opposing nuclear proliferation breaks down.
President Putin may feel that Russia should not have agreed to that memorandum in 1994. But it did. Hitler certainly felt the then German government should not have signed the Versailles Treaty. But it did. Indeed, German negotiators had much less choice in signing the Versailles Treaty in 1919 than Russian negotiators had in 1994 in signing the Budapest Memorandum. There was no duress in 1994.
What is happening to Ukraine, and in a different way what happened to Libya, will make it more difficult to get nuclear-armed regimes to give up weapons in return for guarantees, however solemn. This is not just a matter of international law. It is one of practical politics and global security, for everybody, including militarily neutral countries like Ireland.
Unlike Ukraine, the Baltic states, Latvia and Estonia, which also have Russian-speaking minorities, are members of NATO and do have military alliance guarantees.
It will be an existential test for NATO if Russia makes or carries out threats on Latvia or Estonia, like the ones it has carried out on Ukraine.
The issue of Russian speakers in Ukraine, and in other countries, is at the heart of Putin's strategy. In his speech to the Duma this week, he said: "Russia will always defend their interests, using political, diplomatic and legal means. But it should be above all in Ukraine's interests to ensure that these people's rights are fully protected. This is the guarantee of Ukraine's state stability and territorial integrity".
The last sentence could be read as suggesting that the territorial guarantees only apply if Russia is satisfied with how Russian speakers' rights are looked after.
He also made it clear that he did not recognise the authority of the present government in Kiev, saying, "there is no legitimate authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to".
The big question now is whether Russia will accept the legitimacy of the new government of Ukraine that will emerge from the elections on May 25. Will some elements in Ukraine seek to delegitimise these elections?
Will they be allowed to proceed peacefully in Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine, and will the results be accepted by the losers? Will there be sufficient election monitors in place to guarantee this? Will the monitors be free to go everywhere, or will they be blocked in some places, as OSCE monitors were from entering Crimea? These are vital questions.
JOHN BRUTON IS A FORMER TAOISEACH AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE IFSC DUBLIN.